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INTRODUCTION
In his book, The Will of the People, Barry Friedman argues that the
U.S. Supreme Court and the American people have reached a tacit agree-
ment under which the Court may engage in judicial review as long as it
never strays too far from mainstream public opinion. Those convinced by
Friedman's thesis-and I count myself among the many-are left with
troubling questions about the role of the federal judiciary in our system of
government. First and foremost, what is the purpose of establishing an ap-
pointed, life-tenured federal judiciary if its members inevitably follow the
will of the people? If the Supreme Court's primary function is to "rubber-
stamp public opinion,"' as Friedman's thesis suggests, then why allow judi-
cial review at all? We already have two branches of the federal government
that are bound to serve the constituencies that elected them, so why add
review by a third branch to the same effect? In short, by debunking the
counter-majoritarian difficulty-that is, the claim that judicial review is
undemocratic because it allows unelected judges to reverse decisions made
by elected officials-Friedman leaves the reader with the opposite problem:
how to justify the continued existence of the Supreme Court in light of its
* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. I thank the
symposium participants for their helpful comments and feedback on earlier drafts of this
Essay.
1. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 372
(2009).
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evolution from "an institution intended to check the popular will to one that
frequently confirms it."2
Friedman's book is devoted to describing the Supreme Court's majori-
tarian tendencies, not to defending its existence, and thus his answers to
these questions are necessarily undeveloped. In the book's conclusion,
Friedman suggests that the Supreme Court's true worth lies in its ability to
serve as a catalyst for conversations with the public about constitutional
values.' He argues that "it is through the dialogic process of 'judicial deci-
sion-popular response-judicial re-decision' that the Constitution takes on
the meaning it has."4 Although the Court is ultimately led by the sustained,
strongly felt preferences of the general public, Friedman contends that it has
some leeway to reject the fleeting and ill-conceived whims of the majority
and perhaps even shape emerging public preferences.' If true, the federal
judiciary serves an important role in our system of government despite its
inability to deviate far, or for long, from mainstream opinion. As Friedman
admits, however, legal scholars have only a minimal understanding of how
the courts and public opinion affect one another, and thus his description of
their interactions is nothing more than an educated guess.'
In this Essay, I seek to test Friedman's suggestions by contrasting the
constitutional decisions of the appointed, life-tenured judges of the federal
courts with those of elected state court judges. Elected judges perform es-
sentially the same function as federal judges, and they act under most of the
same institutional constraints, such as serving on collegial courts, issuing
written opinions, and deciding cases within a limited docket. Unlike federal
judges, however, elected state court judges are directly accountable to the
public through periodic elections. As Friedman has shown, federal judges
are kept in check by the public they serve despite their life tenure, raising
the question of whether they act any differently than the other elected offi-
cials who must accede to majority preferences. Thus, variations in these
two court systems' approaches to constitutional cases can shed light on the
purpose of maintaining a federal judiciary that is far from the independent
and apolitical institution that Americans have long believed it to be.
Part I of this Essay briefly describes the empirical evidence demon-
strating that judges facing re-election decide cases differently from those
2. Id. at 4.
3. Id. at 367-68. Friedman describes this role in more detail in some of his other
work; see, e.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REv.
2596 (2003).
4. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 382.
5. Id. at 377-78, 382.
6. Id at 373 ("Far too much time has been spent and ink spilled debating whether
the judiciary is beholden to or independent of majority will (even among those who should
know better). Surprisingly little is devoted to analyzing where, between these two poles, the
answer rests and how the system of judicial review actually works.").
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with job security. In other words, even accepting Friedman's contention
that appointed, life-tenured federal judges are responsive to public opinion,
it is important to acknowledge that such insulated judges nonetheless have
greater leeway to flout majority preferences than those subject to periodic
elections. Part II contrasts the culture of constitutional decision-making at
the state and federal level. Although federal courts have a long history of
expounding on the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, state court judges are
almost pathologically unwilling to engage in constitutional discourse, pre-
ferring instead to defer to the federal judiciary's interpretation of the Consti-
tution. Taken together, Parts I and II seek to show that appointed, life-
tenured federal judges do matter, in that they reach different results, and
create a different constitutional culture, than do elected judges.
Part III examines why this is so in light of the strong evidence that the
Supreme Court is a majoritarian institution just like its elected state coun-
terparts. First, even though federal judges are not insulated from majorita-
rian pressures, they are insulated from electoral pressures. Federal judges
need not please powerful interest groups, raise money for the next cam-
paign, or defend against attack by opponents. Nor do they need to be overly
concerned with the public's immediate reaction to their decisions, but in-
stead must only avoid consistently reaching decisions at odds with sustained
public preferences. Accordingly, federal courts have breathing room to
issue unpopular decisions from time to time, as well as to engage in a con-
stitutional dialogue with the citizenry. Elected state court judges do not
have that luxury, and thus their decisions differ from those of appointed
judges not because they are more responsive to majority preferences, but
rather because they must be attentive to the much narrower subset of the
population who might be able to mobilize public opinion against them as an
election approaches.
Second, and more troubling, the Supreme Court's capacity to ignore
"'the opinion of the moment,"'" and to inspire dialogue about constitutional
values, may depend on the public's mistaken belief that the Court strives to
be principled rather than popular. The federal courts address sensitive sub-
jects such as religion, abortion, and free speech (not to mention selecting the
winner of the Presidential election in 2000). Yet the courts remain the most
popular of the three branches of the federal government.' The widespread
support for the Court would likely decrease if the public understood that the
Court is not the insulated, apolitical institution it purports to be, but rather
follows the will of the people like any other political entity. Ironically,
then, if Friedman is successful in convincing the public that the Supreme
Court is in fact a majoritarian institution, the Court's margin of decisional
7. Id. at 384.
8. Id. at 363 (describing a 2006 Gallup Poll showing Congress's approval rating at
29 percent, the President's at 39 percent, and the Court's at 60 percent).
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independence and its role as catalyst for constitutional discourse might sub-
sequently suffer.'
I. ELECTED VERSUS APPOINTED JUDGES
Thirty-eight states elect their judges.o In those states, the public has
an easy way of communicating with judges, and judges likewise have a
strong incentive to pay attention to public preferences or risk losing their
jobs."
Political scientists have confirmed that elected judges' decisions are
influenced by their need to run for re-election. This phenomenon is particu-
larly notable (and troubling) in criminal cases. Empirical studies demon-
strate that elected judges issue longer sentences and are more likely to im-
pose the death penalty as elections approach, presumably because they fear
being labeled "soft on crime" by their opponent in the next election.12 Their
concerns are reasonable; judges have lost election because they were per-
ceived as too lenient on criminal defendants. For example, West Virginia
Supreme Court Justice Warren McGraw was defeated in 2004 after being
criticized for his refusal to revoke the probation of a convicted child mole-
ster," and Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White lost her bid for re-
election after opponents targeted her vote to reverse a death sentence. 4
9. See infra Part 111.2.
10. See Methods of Judicial Selection, AM. JUDICATURE Soc'v,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial selection/methods/selection of judges.cfm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2010) (providing a detailed description of each state's method of selecting
judges).
I1. Indeed, incumbent judges are slightly less likely to win re-election than are
incumbent members of the House of Representatives, and thus elected judges are under as
much, if not more, pressure to please constituents than members of Congress. See Melinda
Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial
Reform, 95 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 315, 319 (2001).
12. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Jus-
tice Blind When it Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. Sci. 247, 248, 258 (2004) (reviewing
hundreds of decisions by elected Pennsylvania judges and concluding that "all judges, even
the most punitive, increase their sentences as reelection nears"); Richard R. W. Brooks &
Steven Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The Uneasy Relationship Between Judicial
Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 610 (2002) (finding
that "criminal defendants [convicted of murder] were approximately 15% more likely to be
sentenced to death when the sentence was issued during the judge's election year").
13. See Carol Morello, W. Va. Supreme Court Justice Defeated in Rancorous Con-
test, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at Al 5 (describing the "controversial ad" campaign that
"criticized the justice for joining a 3-2 majority extending probation for Tony D. Arbaugh Jr.,
who had been convicted of sexually molesting a half brother"); see also Adam Liptak, Case
May Alter the Elections ofJudges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at A29 (describing the same
ad campaign).
14. Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization ofJudicial Retention Elections: Lessons from
the Defeat ofJustices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 70 (1999).
760 [Vol. 2010:757
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Judicial decisions in civil cases also appear to be affected by electoral
pressures. A study of 7,000 tort decisions found that elected judges impose
higher damage awards in general, and against out-of-state defendants in
particular, than do appointed judges." The study's authors speculated that
the discrepancy between the treatment of in-state and out-of-state defen-
dants was due to the elected judge's incentive to distribute wealth from non-
voters to voters. Elected judges themselves admit that they are influenced
by voter preferences. In one survey of 369 elected judges, a "very high
percentage" reported that "judicial behavior is shaped" by the desire to be
re-elected."
Even though federal judges are also influenced by public opinion, they
nonetheless have the freedom to diverge from popular preferences in a way
that elected state court judges do not. As Friedman puts it, the public's "dif-
fuse" support of the U.S. Supreme Court as an institution allows it to issue
unpopular decisions from time to time, confident that the public will contin-
ue to support the Court even if it dislikes some of its recent opinions."
Friedman explains that "diffuse support is the measure of the slack the
Court has to go its own way on some issues."" The observable differences
between decisions by elected and appointed judges, particularly as elections
near, is evidence that appointed federal judges benefit from significantly
greater slack in the leash that tethers them to public opinion than do elected
judges.
If nothing else, then, the appointed, life-tenured federal judiciary is
better able to withstand majoritarian pressures than are elected judges. At
least in the short-term, they can protect the most vilified members of society
and can avoid decisions based on blatant political calculations in a way that
elected judges cannot.20 As Friedman's book teaches us, however, federal
judges cannot hold the line for long against sustained and strongly-held ma-
jority preferences, and thus any protection they provide is short-lived.
15. Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of
Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 163, 186 (1999) (finding that mean damages awarded
against out-of-state defendants is $144,970 higher in states with elective judiciaries).
16. Id. at 157. Former West Virginia Supreme Court Chief Justice Richard Neely
admitted as much, stating:
As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to in-
jured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced
when I give someone's else[sic] money away, but so is my job security, because
the in-state plaintiffs, their families, and their friends will reelect me.
Id. (quoting RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILrry MESs 4 (1988)).
17. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior,
77 JUDICATURE 306, 315 (1994).
18. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 379.
19. Id.
20. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text; infra note 21 and accompanying
text.
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Moreover, in some notable decisions, such as Korematsu v. United States,
the Court failed to do even that.2' A comparison of the performance of
elected and appointed judges shows that appointed federal judges have at
least a small additional degree of independence to go their own way in hard
cases, but it seems a slim reed on which to justify the very existence of the
third branch of the federal government.
II. ELECTED JUDGES, APPOINTED JUDGES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DIALOGUE
If the federal courts follow majority preferences, then what purpose do
they serve? Friedman tentatively suggests that federal judges provoke a
constitutional dialogue in which the public works through the tension be-
tween democracy and constitutionalism. 22
Friedman's supposition can be tested by comparing the constitutional
jurisprudence of the federal courts with that of the states. As described in
The Will of the People, the Supreme Court has engaged in a vibrant dis-
course with the public about the meaning of the Constitution. Through the
pattern of "'judicial decision-popular response-judicial re-decision,"' the
Supreme Court and the people have together fleshed out vaguely-worded
constitutional principles, updating and changing the Constitution in the
process." State courts should play a similarly important role in the devel-
opment of state constitutional law. Furthermore, as a result of the conjoined
federal and state court systems, under which state courts have the authori-
ty-indeed, the obligation-to hear and decide federal issues,24 state courts
could play a significant part in developing federal constitutional law as well.
Yet it is widely agreed that state courts have not fulfilled their promise, and
that state constitutional jurisprudence is painfully thin and almost entirely
derivative of federal law. 25
In fact, state courts appear to have gone to great lengths to avoid creat-
ing an independent state constitutional culture. State courts have often in-
terpreted their own state's constitution in lockstep with the U.S. Supreme
Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution, despite no requirement
that they do so, and even when the history of the state's constitution would
suggest that an alternative interpretation of the constitutional text would be
the more reasonable one.26 Moreover, even after the U.S. Supreme Court
21. 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944).
22. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 367.
23. Id. at 382.
24. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding that state courts must hear
federal causes of action absent a valid excuse).
25. See infra notes 26-32.
26. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 761, 788-93 (1992) (describing the tendency of state courts to interpret their constitu-
762 [Vol. 2010:757
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declared that state courts could insulate their decisions from Supreme Court
review by clearly grounding them on state constitutional law, 27 state courts
have avoided doing so. Instead, state judges have continued to decide cases
by citing either the U.S. Constitution and the federal precedent expounding
on that document, or by citing both the state and federal constitutions and
precedent, without clarifying which source they rely on for their decision.28
In short, the majority of state courts seemingly wish to avoid articulating the
meaning of their own constitutions, preferring instead to rely on the federal
courts' pronouncements on the U.S. Constitution.
Even more surprising, state court judges appear to have voluntarily
ceded some of their power to decide cases to federal courts. As previously
mentioned, some state courts interpret provisions in their state constitutions
in lockstep with the Supreme Court's views of similar provisions in the U.S.
Constitution.29 In addition, state courts frequently declare themselves bound
to follow federal judicial precedent even when they are under no obligation
to do so.30 Federal judges widely agree that states are not required to adhere
to the decisions of the lower federal courts on the meaning of federal law,
even on questions of constitutional interpretation," and yet some state
courts nonetheless claim that they are so bound, and many others have de-
clared that they will follow this precedent under most circumstances.32
tions in lockstep with federal courts); Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of
State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 338 (2002) ("[S]ystematic
studies demonstrate that most state courts, when presented with the opportunity, have chosen
not to depart from federal precedents when interpreting the rights-granting provisions of state
constitutions."); see generally James N.G. Cauthen, Expanding Rights Under State Constitu-
tions: A Quantitative Appraisal, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1183 (2000) (reviewing 627 state supreme
court opinions on constitutional issues from 25 states, and finding that states frequently based
their interpretation of their own state's constitution on the federal courts' interpretation of
similar provisions in the U.S. Constitution).
27. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
28. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 26, at 779-80 (a study of 1208 state court deci-
sions from seven states revealed that state courts repeatedly failed to specify whether the
holding rested on state or federal constitutional grounds); Felicia A. Rosenfeld, Note, Fulil-
ling the Goal of Michigan v. Long: The State Court Reaction, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1041,
1042 (1988) (a study of 500 state court decisions post-Michigan v. Long revealed that "most
state courts fail to indicate clearly the basis for their constitutional rulings"); RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 516 (6th ed. 2009) (noting that "many post-[Michigan v.] Long state court decisions
fail to indicate clearly whether they rest on state or federal grounds").
29. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
30. See Colin E. Wrabley, Applying Federal Court ofAppeals'Precedent: Contrast-
ing Approaches to Applying Court of Appeals' Federal Law Holdings and Erie State Law
Predictions, 3 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 17 n.77 (2006) (describing different states' views
regarding the precedential effect of lower federal court rulings on questions of federal law).
31. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (stating that Arkansas court is not bound by Eighth Circuit precedent).
32. See Wrabley, supra note 30.
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In sum, state courts repeatedly refuse to develop the meaning of their
own state's constitutions or to elaborate on current interpretations of the
U.S. Constitution, choosing instead to parrot the federal judiciaries' inter-
pretation of the U.S. Constitution. Undoubtedly, there are many reasons for
this dearth of state court constitutional decision-making, and thus it is not
possible to identify a principal cause for the phenomenon. It is likely, how-
ever, that judicial elections play at least some role. As discussed in Part III,
elected state judges are inhibited from discussing constitutional values by
the need to avoid controversy and win the next election.
III. DEFENDING THE MAJORITARIAN FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Part I reviewed the empirical data demonstrating that elections influ-
ence judicial decisions, and Part II described how state judges have failed to
engage in the constitutional discourse that is commonplace among their
federal counterparts. These systemic differences between appointed and
elected judges should perhaps surprise us in light of the evidence marshaled
by Friedman that federal judges are not insulated from public opinion, and
thus would be expected to decide cases similarly to elected judges. As
Friedman's book amply demonstrates, time and again federal judges accede
to majority preferences, often reversing course to do so.3 If federal judges
are beholden to the public just like elected state judges, why do we see such
variation in their performance on the bench? The answer to this question
can also shed light on the value of maintaining a (supposedly) politically-
insulated federal judiciary that rarely deviates far, at least for long, from
mainstream public opinion.
A. Electoral Versus Majoritarian Pressure
One possible answer is that even though federal judges are influenced
by broadly held and sustained public sentiment, they are insulated from
electoral politics and all the distortions of majority preferences that accom-
pany elections. We tend to view elections as the method by which the ma-
jority expresses its views, but the truth is that the majority rarely speaks
through elections themselves. Due to low voter turnout, very few elected
officials are voted into office by a majority of their constituents, a problem
that is particularly pronounced in low salience judicial elections. On aver-
age, less than thirty percent of registered voters vote in judicial elections.'
33. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 3-4 (describing how the Supreme Court
stopped striking down New Deal legislation as unconstitutional shortly after President Roo-
sevelt proposed legislation to "pack" the Court by adding new justices).
34. See, e.g., Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, A Strategy for Judicial
Performance Evaluation in New York, 72 ALB. L. REv. 655, 655 (2009) (noting that on aver-
764 [Vol. 2010:757
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Moreover, any elected judge knows that his or her most important suppor-
ters are a small cadre of interest groups, media elites, and campaign donors
who can prevent her from being displaced by an opponent in the next elec-
tion, or alternatively can fund and support that opponent.3 ' Thus, elected
judges, like all elected officials, will strive to please a few particularly po-
werful groups-or at least avoid angering them-rather than engage in a
dialogue with the general public about constitutional values.
Friedman comments on this phenomenon in chapter ten of The Will of
the People, in which he describes the public's reaction to the Rehnquist
Court's decisions. Elected officials and interest groups on both the right
and the left decried that Court's "activist" decisions and even occasionally
threatened impeachment, jurisdiction-stripping, and other forms of repris-
al." The average American, however, reacted to the Court's decisions with
equanimity.37 As Friedman observed, this gap between the people and their
elected representatives is likely due to the distortions of the electoral
process. Each party's primaries produce elected officials on the extremes of
the political spectrum, a polarization that has worsened with computer-aided
partisan gerrymandering." In other words, judges seeking to win re-
election have to please a very particular subset of influence-peddlers who
can make or break their bid to retain office, and must do so within a very
specific temporal window.39 In comparison, federal judges need only re-
main sufficiently popular to ensure that their decisions are enforced and
complied with, and to avoid impeachment and jurisdiction-stripping. To do
so, federal judges must be careful not to deviate too far from mainstream
values over the long term, but they need not cater to the whim of a fleeting
majority, or seek to curry favor with powerful special interests, as is re-
quired of elected officials.
The fact that federal judges are insulated from electoral pressures
while remaining attentive to mainstream public opinion enables them to
listen to and be influenced by the majority in a way that elected officials are
not. Elected officials cannot afford to test the breadth and depth of the pub-
lic's opinion on sensitive issues-such as abortion, crime, and religious
freedom-as the appointed, life-tenured federal judiciary can. Rather,
elected officials must either avoid these questions altogether or else answer
age only 20% of electorate vote in New York's judicial elections); Mark A. Behrens & Cary
Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court
Judges, II CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 273, 290 (2002) (stating that 3 out of 10 registered
voters participated in Pennsylvania's 1997 judicial elections, and in Wisconsin an average of
less than 25% participate in judicial elections).
35. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 34, at 278.
36. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 350.
37. Id. at 351.
38. Id. at 352.
39. Id. at 351-52.
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them as activists and interest groups prefer-even though these organized
groups may not represent the majority view. Ironically, it seems that ap-
pointed, life-tenured federal judges are sometimes better at satisfying main-
stream preferences than Congress, the President, or the elected judges.
Friedman acknowledges this possibility when he takes note of "the very odd
fact that the Court of late seems to be doing a better job than the Congress
in meeting public expectations."40
An example is useful here. The Supreme Court's death penalty juri-
sprudence, and specifically its recent decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana ab-
olishing the death penalty for child rape, illustrates the way in which the
federal courts can inspire dialogue on an issue that oftentimes paralyzes
elected officials, including elected judges.4'
The Eighth Amendment is one of the few areas of the Court's juri-
sprudence that is explicitly guided by the will of the people.42 The Court
frequently polls state practices in an effort to determine whether a penalty
transgresses the nation's "evolving standards of decency."43 The Court's
conclusions do not rest entirely on contemporary public opinion, however,
the Justices also bring their "own independent judgment" to bear on the
question whether a punishment transgresses the limits of the Eighth
Amendment."
Using this formula, the Supreme Court flirted with holding the death
penalty unconstitutional in its 1972 opinion in Furman v. Georgia,4" decided
at a time when the public seemed ready to abolish capital punishment.46
Rather than put an end to the practice, however, Furman generated a public
backlash in favor of the death penalty. Furman had left open the possibility
that states could restructure their use of capital punishment to satisfy consti-
tutional standards, and state after state enacted legislation attempting to
meet the Court's new requirements. Within a year, close to half of the
states had put into place new death penalty regimes, and opinion polls
showed that the public was strongly in favor of maintaining capital punish-
ment.47 Only four years later, in 1976, the Court revisited the issue and con-
cluded that capital punishment did not transgress the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against "cruel" and "unusual punishment."48
40. Id. at 372.
41. 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
42. See, e.g., id. at 419-20.
43. See, e.g., id. at 419-21.
44. See, e.g., id. at 421.
45. 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972).
46. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 286 ("If there ever was a moment in American histo-
ry when social indicators suggested that abolition of the death penalty was possible, this was
it.").
47. Id at 287.
48. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
766 [Vol. 2010:757
Defending the Majoritarian Court
The Court's retreat supports Friedman's thesis: ultimately, the "will of
the people" prevailed, forcing the Court to backtrack from its suggestion
that the death penalty was inconsistent with America's constitutional values.
But the relevant fact for the purpose of this Essay is the Court's willingness
and ability to raise the possibility of abolishing the death penalty at all. By
suggesting that the death penalty was constitutionally suspect, at least in
part because of its arbitrary and racist application, the Court focused the
country's attention on capital punishment and influenced debate over the
death penalty for years to come. As a practical matter, the Court's holding
in Furman v. Georgia required the states to rewrite their death penalty sta-
tutes to ensure a more fair and systematic use of that penalty. Although the
subsequent shift of public sentiment in favor of the death penalty probably
took the Court by surprise, the Court nonetheless had succeeded in fostering
discussion about capital punishment and cabining its use. An elected judge
might have shied away from the entire morass, fearing that the backlash that
might follow (indeed, that did follow) could end that judge's career. The
Court's insulation from electoral politics allowed it to raise the issue, even
though its vulnerability to popular opinion ultimately required it to abandon
its view that the death penalty was inconsistent with the Eighth Amend-
ment.
More recent history regarding the death penalty reinforces the point.
Over the last decade, the Court has revisited the death penalty for three
classes of defendants: the mentally retarded,49 juveniles,50 and child rapists
who do not kill their victims." In each case, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment did not tolerate capital punishment. In each case, the Court
supported that conclusion both by noting that a majority of states did not
provide the death penalty for these categories of defendants, and by reason-
ing that the norms of civilized society dictated against execution of these
types of defendants.52 The view that the death penalty should be off-limits
for these categories of offenders appears to fit within mainstream American
views regarding use of the death penalty.
And yet, at least some elected judges in some states would be reluctant
to abolish capital punishment for these categories of offenders, even when
the majority of the public does not support it, because that decision might be
used by opponents to paint them generally as "soft on crime," or to mobilize
the minority who strongly support the death penalty for these types of
crimes and defendants. Politically, there is little to gain from taking on this
issue. One observer of judicial elections commented on this phenomenon:
49. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306-07 (2002).
50. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555-56 (2005).
51. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,412 (2008).
52. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-67; Kennedy, 544 U.S. at
422-26.
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Sitting judges facing an imminent election, whether a contested election or a reten-
tion election, know that every decision is potentially fodder for the opposition.
When well-heeled or well-organized interest groups can seize on isolated opi-
nions-even well-reasoned decisions that have been joined by a majority of other
judges on the court-as the basis for attack ads in the next campaign, it takes ex-
traordinary integrity and real courage for a judge facing reelection to support a rul-
ing that plainly will be unpopular.5 3
The decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana, in which the Court struck down
the death penalty for child rapists, is an example of how appointed judges
can address issues that are too sensitive for elected officials. The elected
justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the Louisiana statute mak-
ing child rape a death-eligible crime as consistent with the Eighth Amend-
ment, perhaps mindful of how a decision the other way could be used
against them in upcoming elections. Likewise, Senators Barack Obama and
John McCain-respectively, the presumptive Democratic and Republican
Presidential nominees at the time the case was decided-both immediately
condemned the decision.54 In such a high salience case, elected officials
were understandably reluctant to energize the opposition by taking on the
question of the appropriate punishment for child rapists, leaving the ap-
pointed federal judiciary in the best position to do so.
In sum, the federal courts add value to our system of government, de-
spite their inability to define constitutional values independently of public
opinion, because they can prod the public to consider questions that the po-
litical branches would prefer to avoid. Even though the federal courts ap-
pear incapable of standing up against the groundswell of majority prefe-
rence for long, they can push the envelope in a way that elected officials,
including elected judges, cannot. Perhaps most important, federal judges'
insulation from electoral politics allows them to bypass special interests,
party activists, and campaign donors, and listen instead to what the majority
of the general public prefers. Perhaps the Court's value lies in the purity of
its majoritarianism. In other words, the courts have the luxury of listening
to the general public without the din of elections that so distracts the politi-
cal branches of government.
B. A Political Institution in Disguise
Unfortunately, however, there is also a less benign explanation for the
Supreme Court's ability to raise issues that elected judges shy away from.
As Friedman explains, the Court enjoys broad public support that allows it
53. Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 73, 75 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007).
54. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Rejects Death Penalty for Child Rape, N.Y.
TIMES, June. 26, 2008, at Al.
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the necessary "slack . . . to go its own way on some issues."" Perhaps the
Court is popular not just because it follows the will of the people, but be-
cause it does so in the guise of being the neutral, impartial interpreter of
law. As Friedman's book explains, the Supreme Court has carefully given
the public most of what it wants while at the same time claiming that public
preferences are irrelevant to its decision-making. If the truth ever came out
that the Court is more interested in being popular than being principled, it
might lose some of its public support, shortening the "slack" allowed be-
tween its decisions and public preferences.
In The Will of the People, Friedman argues that the Supreme Court is
not the staunchly independent institution it appears to be on paper, but ra-
ther is vulnerable to political and public pressure." Friedman explains that
the American people "support the exercise of judicial review . . . only so
long as the Court's decisions d[o] not stray far, and for long, from the heart
of what the public understood the Constitution to mean." To most people,
however, the Supreme Court gives a good imitation of a non-political, inde-
pendent institution that stands aloof from the partisan bickering that para-
lyzes the elected branches and taints so much of their decision-making. Its
members have life-tenure and salary protection, they are at negligible risk of
impeachment even for unpopular decisions, and they more or less control
their docket. At confirmation hearings, the nominees are supposed to deny
any role in policymaking, claiming that their job is to be nothing more than
the neutral interpreter of others' policy choices." Chief Justice John Ro-
berts went so far as to claim that "judges are like umpires," whose primary
role is to "call balls and strikes."" Friedman's view that the Court follows
the will of the people, while now widely accepted among academics, would
likely come as a surprise to the average American.
In his book, Friedman cites opinion polls revealing that the Court is
generally far more popular and trusted than the political branches," and
even that the public preferred the Supreme Court to decide the 2000 election
55. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 379.
56. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 14 (explaining that "[t]he justices recog-
nize the fragility of their position," which pushes them to issue "decisions hew[ing] rather
closely to the mainstream of popular judgment about the meaning of the Constitution.").
57. See, e.g., Kim McLane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons
from Judge Cardozo, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1629, 1630 (2010).
58. See Roberts: 'My Job Is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat', CNN
POLITICs (Sept. 12, 2005), http://articles.cnn.com/2005-09-12/politics/roberts.statement-1
judicial-role-judges-judicial-oath? s=PM:POLITICS (reporting the complete transcript of
Chief Justice Roberts's opening statement at his confirmation hearings).
59. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 363 (describing a 2006 Gallup Poll showing Con-
gress's approval rating at 29 percent, the President's at 39 percent, and the Court's at 60
percent).
Fall] 769
Michigan State Law Review
over other political actors.' One assumes, however, that these polls reflect
the public's sense that the Court is somehow "pure" in a way that the politi-
cal branches are not-a conclusion supported by recent studies of public
perceptions of the Court." If so, the public is correct in one sense-the
Court is insulated from the electoral pressures that can corrupt elected offi-
cials-but, as Friedman shows, the public is wrong to think of the Court as
so different from the political branches.
Perhaps the Court's perceived independence from public opinion is
more important than the reality as described by Friedman. Perhaps the pub-
lic respects the Court and accepts its decisions because it does not realize
that the Court is nearly as beholden to public opinion as the other institu-
tions of government the public loves to hate. In other words, the Court may
have maintained its high public esteem primarily because it has fooled
Americans into thinking it is an independent and apolitical institution even
as it is quick to bring its constitutional jurisprudence in line with main-
stream opinion.
Interestingly, the federal judiciary's guise of independence is perpe-
tuated by elected officials, who benefit from this misperception. As dis-
cussed in Part II, elected state court judges seem strangely unwilling to in-
terpret their state constitutions, preferring to rely on federal precedent and
the U.S. Constitution to support their rulings.62 Some scholars have sug-
gested that elected state court judges prefer to ground their decisions in fed-
eral rather than state law because they want the political cover that comes
with a decision that cites the allegedly apolitical federal courts and is eligi-
ble for Supreme Court review.' State courts may be reticent to expound on
their own constitutions because they fear the political fallout from such de-
cisions, preferring to hide behind the cloak of the power and prestige of the
60. Id. at 358 (citing a Gallup poll concluding that "Americans ... felt that the Su-
preme Court was the best institution to make a final decision to resolve the controversy in
Florida-much more so than the Florida Supreme Court, the Florida legislature, or even the
U.S. Congress.").
61. James L. Gibson & Gregory Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legiti-
macy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, (Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 1491128, Oct.
19, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1491128.
62. See supra notes 26-35.
63. See, e.g., Edward Hartnett, Why is the Supreme Court of the United States Pro-
tecting State Judges from Popular Democracy?, 75 TEX. L. REv. 907, 983 (1997) (positing
that state courts prefer to issue decisions that are reviewable by the Supreme Court in order
to "insulat[e] themselves from internal political pressure"); Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine For-
mulation and Distrust, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2045, 2080 (2008) (speculating that the
Supreme Court began reviewing state court damage awards due to its "increasing conviction
that juries had gotten out of control, and that at least some state courts were unwilling to rein
them in . . . because the political environment in various states made state court judges reluc-
tant to take action in the absence of cover from the Supreme Court.").
770 [Vol. 2010:757
Defending the Majoritarian Court
U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the well-respected federal judiciary.'
Likewise, examples abound of elected federal officials claiming that their
"hands are tied" by Supreme Court opinions, or suggesting that the Court
should review and reverse federal legislation--even legislation that these
legislators themselves supported-on the ground that it is unconstitutional.6"
All of these elected officials have a vested interest in maintaining the fiction
that the Court is uniquely independent of the political pressures that, as
Friedman has shown, influence its decision-making.
Recent studies confirm that the public's good impression of the Court
is grounded on its perception of the Court as neutral and apolitical.66 Most
people polled are aware that judging is a discretionary and value-laden ac-
tivity, and yet they view the members of the Court as more principled than
the typical elected politicians. Political scientists James Gibson and Gre-
gory Caldeira sought to determine why the public maintains a high opinion
of the Court despite recognizing that judging is in some sense "political."
A majority of the people they surveyed agreed that the justices base their
opinions on their "personal beliefs," and that judges' values and political
views influence their decisions, but a majority nonetheless "rejectled] the
view that judges are just politicians in robes."" Gibson and Caldeira con-
cluded that the public's support for the Court "depends upon seeing judges
as different from ordinary politicians, in part because, unlike politicians,
they are principled in their decision making."" In another paper, these same
two authors found that political advertisements regarding Judge Samuel
Alito's nomination undermined the Supreme Court's legitimacy, and they
speculated that "the message of these ads was that the Supreme Court is just
another political institution, and that citizens exposed to that argument were
less likely to extend support to the Supreme Court.""o The authors conclude
64. Hartnett, supra note 63. Interestingly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court does
not shy away from issuing pronouncements based on the state constitution. See, e.g., State v.
Ball, 471 A.2d 347 (1983). That court routinely declares that any citations to federal law are
merely for "guidance" in interpreting the state constitution, insulating its decisions from
review in the U.S. Supreme Court as much as possible. Id. at 352. As Professor Hartnett
notes, New Hampshire's willingness to take the full political heat for its decisions may be
due to the fact that its judges are appointed, not elected, and thus have no need for the politi-
cal protection that comes from the potential for Supreme Court review. Hartnett, supra note
63.
65. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Senator Specter and the Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 20,
2010), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/20/senator-specter-and-the-law/.
66. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 61, at 12.
67. See id. at I1.
68. Id. at 12-13.
69. Id. at 15.
70. Id. at 5.
Fall] 771
Michigan State Law Review
that the "Court is best able to maintain its legitimacy by pointing toward its
distinctive 'non-political' role in the American political system." 7 1
In short, it seems possible that the public views the Court as a "coun-
ter-majoritarian" institution, just as many academics did before scholars
such as Friedman enlightened us. Admittedly, public opinion polls are blunt
instruments. In any case, none have framed the question in precisely these
terms, so it is hard to ascertain the public's views on whether the Court is
influenced by public opinion. But, if the public's respect for the Court is
grounded, at least in part, on its misconception about the Court's indepen-
dence, then Friedman's book might actually change the relationship be-
tween the public and the judiciary. If word gets out that the Court is as sus-
ceptible to public pressure as the other political institutions, then it will no
longer serve as political cover for the elected branches of government, its
decisions will not be as easily accepted by the public, and it will lose the
diffuse support that enables it to help shape public opinion about constitu-
tional values. In other words, perhaps the Court has flourished not only
because it follows the will of the people, but perhaps also because it gives
the impression that it need not do so.
CONCLUSION
Barry Friedman's book The Will of the People is the culmination of
fifteen years of research and writing challenging the assumption that the
Supreme Court is a counter-majoritarian institution. As Friedman suggests,
it is time to stop endlessly debating whether the Court is influenced by pub-
lic opinion and address the serious questions that follow from the conclu-
sion that it is.72 The most basic of those questions is determining the value
of a federal judiciary that appears incapable of serving as a check on the
majority.
The beginnings of an answer can be found by contrasting the work of
the federal courts with those of elected state court judges. As many political
scientists have shown, subjecting judges to elections does change the out-
come of cases and the tone of the constitutional "conversation" that courts
have with citizenry. An appointed federal judge is more likely to protect the
criminal defendant and the unpopular civil defendant than is an elected
judge, especially when elections are imminent. More important, appointed
judges are capable of raising hard questions regarding the nation's constitu-
7 1. Id.
72. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 373 ("Far too much time has been spent and ink
spilled debating whether the judiciary is beholden to or independent of majority will (even
among those who should know better). Surprisingly little is devoted to analyzing where
between these two poles the answer rests and how the system of judicial review actually
works.").
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tional values that elected judges-and elected officials generally-have
usually avoided. Thus, despite their vulnerability to political and social
pressure, appointed federal judges appear capable of protecting constitu-
tional values and debating constitutional meaning in a way that elected offi-
cials, including judges, cannot.
The comparison tells us that appointed judges do more than simply
"rubberstamp public opinion," but it does not tell us how or why appointed
federal judges reach different types of decisions than their elected counter-
parts. This Essay suggests that federal judges benefit from their insulation
from electoral pressures-pressures that at times can cause elected officials
(including elected judges) to veer away from mainstream preferences in an
effort to appease politically powerful interest groups who threaten their
prospects in upcoming elections. In addition, federal judges have the bene-
fit of appearing to be neutral and apolitical, even though they are not, and
thus the public has greater tolerance for judicial opinion than it does for
more blatantly political decision-making by the legislative and executive
branches.
